RECENT CASES.
ADnIRALTY-STATE DEATH AcT--CoNTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENcE.-Libel by the
administrator of a deceased stevedore to recover damages for his wrongful
death under the statute of Maine (P, S. 19T6, c. 92, sec. 9) granting a right
of action in such cases. The contributory negligence of the deceased is set
up as a defense. Held: Contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery.
The Devona, i Fed. (2d) 482 (D. C. i924).
The court applied the usual admiralty rule that the libellant's contributory negligence should work only in mitigation of damages, and not as -a.
complete bar to a recovery, as at common law. It based its decision primarily on the language in Southern Pacific Co. v. Tenscn, 244 U. S. 2o*

(1917), and Chelentis v. Luekenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372 (I9z8). In
the Jensen case it *was said: "And plainly, we think, no such (state) legislation is valid if it . . . works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony
and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations."
Prior to the Jensen case there had been many decisions on the validity and,
effect in admiralty of the state death acts. In all of them it had been held
that the acts were valid and that if the statute itself made contributory negligence a bar to a recovery it was effective. The A. W. Thompson, 39 Fed.
i15 (D. C. 1889) ; The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. 93 (D. C. i893); Gretsch-.
inann v. Fix, 18 Fed. 716 (D. C. i911). And it had been accepted also that
since the body creating the right was accustomed to regard contributory negligence as a defense, it was intended to be a defense here also, although not
specifically stated in the particular statute. Robinson v. Detroit Nay. Co., 7"
Fed. 883 (C. C. A. x896); Regina v. Dunlop, 128 Fed. 74 D. C. 1904);
Quinelne v. Bisso, 136 Fed. 825 (C. C. A. igo5). Similarly, the limitations
as to the time in which the action must be brought have been applied instead of the admiralty doctrine of laches. The Harrisburg,.u9 U. S. 199
(1886) ; IneriiationalNav. Co. v. Lindstrom, 123 Fed. 475" (C. C. A. z903) ;
Williams v. Quebec'S. S. Co., x26 Fed. 59! (D. C. 1903). One case has
even applied the general statute of limitations. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
257 U. S. 233 (192!). But see The Win. M. Hoag, 69 Fed. 742 (D. C. x89s),
where even a specific limitation was ignored. And, although such torts
usually afford an action in rem in admiralty, the admiralty rule is not applied to actions brought under the state acts, and they are not construed to.
give anything hut a right in personam unless they expressly give the right
in rem. The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335 (1892); The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398
(19o8); The Saninanger, 298 Fed. 62o (D. C. 1924). In the cases on the
state laws giving liens for supplies furnished in the home port the limitation
expressed in the act granting the right has also been applied. The Edith,
94 U. S. 518 (876) ; H1. N. Emilie, 70 Fed. 5i (D. C. 1895) ; James G. SUwa,
1o6 Fed. 94 (D. C. 1901). But there appears to be an impression that the
general statute of limitations is inapplicable. Boon v. Hornet, Crabbe 46
(D. C. 1841), semblk; 2 PARSOxS ON SHIPPIxG, 325. Quacre, as to the distinction.
It is submitted that the Jensen case has not affected the law on thisr
matter. The language uoted supra was intended to apply to matters of
(201)

202

UNIVERSITY OF PE.VNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

general admiralty cognizance, and not to certain other points as to which
it was recognized the states could legislate, and which were discussed in
reaching the rule enunciated. In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra, the
Supreme Court subsequently stated that the death cases did not come within
this rule and not only enforced the death statute hut applied to it the general
limitations of the code of civil procedure. Similarly, in O'Brien v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 293 Fed. Y-o (C. C. A. 1923), the state's rule of contributory
negligence, and in The James McGee, 300 Fed. 93 (D. C. 1924), the state's
rule on the presumptions of negligence were applied. And in Nolte v. Hudson Nov. Co., 297 Fed. 758 (C. C. A. 1924), the court foilowed the state
limitation on liens when applying the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 STAr.
AT L. 250, sec. 30. which provides that the previous rules in regard to laches
shall be unaffected by it. Thus it seems to be still recognized that the states
can give rights of action in certain matters in admiralty and can prescribe
their limits. If they have the power to limit them at all, they can do it
equally well whether the restriction be in the specific act which gives the
right or in some other rule of substantive law. It is submitted that the
state's common law rule should have been applied here and that the contributory negligence should have been a complete defense to the action.
BANKRUPTCY-SURETYSHIP-EXTENT OF SUBROATIO.--A creditor held a
note of the principal debtors, indorsed by five sureties. The creditor recovered a judgment against Thompson, one of the surety-indorsers. The creditor then compelled another surety, H, to pay the debt in full. One of the
sureties was insolvent and Thompson was in bankruptcy. H filed a claim
against the bankrupt's estate for the full amount he had paid and claimed
dividends on that amount; the referee denied this claim and held that H
was entitled to prove a claim on one-fourth of. the amount he had paid. The
court reversed the referee, holding that the paying surety may make proof
against the estate of his co-sureiy exactly as the creditor could whose debt
he paid, being limited in recovery, however, to the ratable part for which
the surety is liable. In re Thompson, 3oo Fed. 215 (D. C. 1924).
The cases recognize that a paying surety is ehtitled to be subrogated to
all the rights and remedies of the creditor as against his co-sureties, in precisely the same manner as against the pirincipal debtor. Lidderdale v. Robinsnr. 2 Brock. i,0 (U. S. C. C. x824), affirmed in -2 Wheat. 594 (U. S.
1827) ; Croft v. Moore, 9 Veatts 451 (Pa. i84o). But when we come to the
extent of the subrogation permitted, we find an irreconcilable conflict of authority.
One view is, that the liability of a co-surety is only for that which the
other has paid for him, and therefore he can prove for that amount only
(one-fourth, in the principal case); 'that the paying surety may use the
security or rights which the creditor has obtained only to that extent; and
unless the paying surety is prejudiced by being deprived of subrogation, payment will satisfy and extinguish the judgment. and the paying surety will be
remitted to his individual rights against his co-sureties for the amount paid
to their use. Because the creditor might prove the whole claim is no reason why the paying surety should. A paying surety takes the risk of the in-

RECENT CASES
solvency of his co-sureties, and it is inequitable to other creditors of the
insolvent to permit a claim for more than the insolvent estate really owes
the paying surety. New Bedford Institwilon for Savings v. Hathaway, z34
Mass. 69 (1882); Apperson, et al. v. Wilbourn, ef al., 58 Miss. 439 (x88o).
semble.
The other view takes the position that the paying surety is subrogated ta
all the rights of the creditor, and as the creditor could have proved for the
whole debt, so likewise may the paying surety. At the time of the declared
insolvency, the rights of the creditors become fixed, a constant quantity;
each creditor becomes part owner of the assets to such an extent as his debt
bears to the total debts. When the surety pays the debt, he succeeds to that
quasi-ownership of the creditor whose debt he pays; this is not inequitable
as to the other creditors, as their rights, fixed at the date of insolvency, are
unimpaired. This position is similar to the "equity rule," regarding proof
made by a creditor with collateral; such a creditor can prove for and receive dividends on the full amount of his claim, regardless of any sums" received from his collateral after the transfer of the assets from the debtor in
insolvency, provided he shall not receivi more than the full amount due him.
Miller's Appeal, 35 Pa. 481 (i86o); Chemical National Bank v. Armstrongj
59 Fed. 372 (C. C. A. 1893) ; contra, Amnory v. Francis, x6 Mass. 309 (1820).
This position, it is claimed, works out the equities among the sureties as if creditor's right had been enforced against them in a way conformable to their
rights against each other, nd makes the rights of the paying surety fixed and
certain, instead of depending on the election of the creditor to proceed first
against the insolvent or the solvent surety. Ex parte Stokes, De Gex Bankruptcy Cases, 618 (Eng. 1848) ; Hess's Estate, 69 Pa. 272 (187); Pace v.
Pace's Adm'r., et a!., 95 Va. 792, 30 S. E. 361 (x898).
As a practical matter, the view of the principal case is better, as it fixes
the rights of the paying surety. It is to the interest of the .solvent surey that
the creditor prove his full claim against the insolvent estate; it is to the interest of the other creditors of the insolvent to have the creditor collect in
full from the solvent surety, and then have the latter come against the estate
with his smaller claim (if that is all that will be permitted) for contribution.
So the criticism has been made that the Massachusetts view gives opportunity to the creditor by collusion or otherwise to further the interest of one
surety at the expense of the just and equal rights of the co-surety. Pace v.
Pace, et al., supra. By permitting the paying surety to prove for the full
claim and limiting his dividends to the amount for which the co-surety is
liable, the rights of the parties are adjusted with substantial equity.
CONSTITVT1O'.%AL LAw-DvE P9OcaSS-U;MiTATIoN OF NuMBER OF AGENTS
oF IXsTuRACE CorPAiE&S.-A statute prohibited insurance companies from
having more than two agents. It permitted, however, an agent to have as
many solicitors as he desired in any city. The plaintiff, desiring to represent a company in a city where it already had two agents, claimed the statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Held: The statute is unconstitutional. .Vorthwestern National Insurance Co.
v. Fishback, 2-8 Pac. 5x6 (Wash. 1924).
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The court emphasized that the legislature had failed to show that the
statute was of benefit to the public and held that it was a discriminatory measure tending to monopoly. However, in determining the constitutionality of a
law, the burden is not upon the state to show that the law is reasonable.
Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425 (igoi). The legislature should be given the
benefit of every doubt; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539 (i9o8) ; and every
presumption should be made in favor of the statute. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.
S. 6o6 (1902). The dissenting judges suggested a reasonable purpose for the
regulation, namely, to curtail the number of record insurance agencies, and so
to simplify the work of the insurance commission of the state. Cf. La
Tourette v. McMasters, 248 U. S. 465 (1918). Whether a given regulation
is reasonable and valid under the Fourteenth Amendment is usually
a very doubtful question, upon which even the United' States Supreme
Court is apt to be divided. Cf..Holden v. Hardy, i69 U. S. 366 (1897) ;
Lochner v. New York, i98 U. S. 45 (igo4); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590
(1917).
A phase of this problem is whether the right to engage in a
lawful employment may be abridged. See Matter of Low, 54 Kan. 757,
39 Pac. 7io (1895); Schnair v. Navarre, etc., Co., 182 N. Y. 83, 74 N. E.
It has been held that an exclusion of persons from a given
561 (9o5).
business is within the state's police power, if the exclusion is not designed
to confer special privilege even though such privilege may result as an incidental effect. Decie z,. Brownm. i67 Mass. 290, 45 N. E. 765 (z897).
This
seems to be the sound view. See FREUND, PoLicE PowER, 694.
Inasmuch as in the instant case a valid purpose may be found for the
enacting of the statute, and since the plaintiff is not excluded from engaging
in the business of an insurance agent if some company should desire to appoint him as one of its two representatives, it is submitted that the court could
have found sufficient grounds to hold the statute reasonable and valid.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WAR PowER-DIvERsIoN OF CoAL.-The defendant's predecessor as Director General of Railroads, under authority conferred
by the Fuel Administrator, after the signing of the Armistice and on account
of the serious coal strike of November, igig, diverted coal consigned to the
plaintiff, for use on certain railroads" under his control. Held: The act of
diversion was wrongful and the defendant was liable in tort for the conversion. Newton Coal Co. v. Davis, Director General of Railroads, :281 Pa.
74 (xor4).
The main question raised in the opinion is whether the defendant had

authority to divert the coal, the court reaching the conclusion that he had
not, on the ground that the power of Congress and of the President to make
such regulations had expired, although the Lever Act, 40 STAT. AT L 28, C.
S3, see. 25, under which the Director General purported to act, specifically
provided that it should remain in force until the war should have terminated
and the fact and date of such termination should be ascertained and pro-

claimed by the President.
It is well settled that during a war the authority of Congress is practically unlimited, unless the subject of legislation is obviously and flagrantly
unconnected with the prosecution of the war. Hamilton v. Kentucky Co., 251
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U. S. 146 (1i9i). The court in the principal case is creating a third status,
between a state of war and that of peace, in which the nature and purpose
of such governmental activities may be examined. It is clear that the Armistice did not end the war as such, but merely indicated, from a military
standpoint, a general cessation of hostilities': 2 OPPEXHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, (2d. ed.) -go: Hijo v'. United States, 194 U. S. 315, 323 (1904); and
such has been the view adopted by the majority of those courts which have
had occasion to pass upon this question; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson,
255 Fed. 99 (D. C. 1919) ; United Slates v. Oglesby Grocery Co., 264 Fed. 691
(D. C. 12o) ; State v. Dixon, 66 Mont. 76, 99, 213 Pac. 227, 235 (x923).
Some courts have held otherwise, under the Lever Act, on the strong ground
that the President, in his message to Congress of November iT, 1918, declared several times that the war was over; United States v. Hicks, 256 Fed.
7o7 (D. C. igg); but it seems better to take this as referring only to hostilities, in view of the universally known facts, and especially since the
President clearly so indicated by subsequent acts, and it was so field in Hamiltdn v. Kentucky Co., supra, which rejected the argument used in the case
just cited.
In the principal case the court attempts to determine when the act lapsed
without regard to section 24, but it would seem to be the better view to
accept the statements of the other departments of government as to states
of war and peace. Kneeland-Bigelow Co. v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 207
Mich.But
s46, x74 N. W. 6o5 Wg).
the facts of this case show no authority in the defendant
to make
such a diversion of coal, that power having been entrusted to the Fuel Administrator by the President's executive order of October 30, i919, which authorized him to make such regulations of distribution as "may in his judgment be necessary." The Fuel Administrator then gave the defendant's
predecessor full authority to make such diversions, as his agent, but ii
is clear that this attempted delegation of authority must bave been ineffectual;
Mf[ECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed.), sec. 307. Nor does the Overman Act, 4o STAT.
AT L. 556, c. 78, provide for such a transfer of authority, giving power only
to the President and only in "matters relating to the conduct of the present
war" which, as the sole limit, is too specific to cover this case. It is submitted, therefore, that the decision of the principal case is correct, because
of the lack of authority in the Director General and not because of the want
of constitutional power in Congress or in the President.
CO TRACTS -RsTRAINT oF TRADE-RESTICTIE AGaREEMET. WITH PUBLIC
UTLITY.-A city. in purchasing the water works of a water company,

covenanted not to supply water outside a specified area. Held: This con,tract was void as an illegal restraint of trade. East Jersey Water Co. v.
City of Newark, 125 At. 578 (N. J. Eq. 1924).
In general, agreements in unreasonable restraint of trade are illegal and
void; Aimerican Laundry Co. v. E. & W. Dry Cleaning Co., i99 Ala. 154,
74 So. 58 (1917); but agreements in partial restraint of trade are reasonable and valid. Carter v. Ailing, 43 Fed. 2o8 (C. C. A. i8go)' ; Rose v. Gordon, 158 Wis. 414, 149 N. W. I58 (1914). The theory on which these partial
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restraints are allowed is that there must be a public policy requiring the
restraint which outweighs the public policy forbidding it. Therefore, where
a contract in restraint of trade is injurious to public interest, the reason for
allowing it is gone, and it will not be sustained, however partial and reasonable, as between the parties, the restraint may be. Nester v. Continental
Brewing Co., i61 Pa. 473, 29 At!. o2 (x894). This is particularly true of
contracts affecting business of a quasi-public character, such as that of railroads, Chicago, Etc., R. R. Co. v. Southern Indiana R. R. Co., 38 Ind. App.
234, 70 N. E. 843 (19o4); telegraph, Central'New York Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Averill, x99 N. Y. 128, 92 N. E. 206 (xgio) ; telephone, Gwynn
v. Citizens Telephone Co., 69 S. C. 434, 48 S. E. 46D (19o4); gas, Gibbs v.
Consolidated Gai Co. of Baltimore, 130 U. S. 396 (1889)'; electric, Keene
Syndicate v. Wichita Gas, Electric, etc., Co., 69 Kan. 284, 76 Pac. 834 (1904) ;
and other public service corporations. Union Bank v. Kinloch Telephone
Co., 258 I1. 202, ior N. E. 535 (1913). But the New York rule, based upon
the right of freedom of contract, is that quasi-public corporations may make
contracts in reasonable restraint of trade so long as the public rights are not
unduly affected. Whitaker v. Kilby, 55 Misc. 337, io6 N. Y. Supp. 5i

0907).

It is to be noted that the enumerated cases concern public utilities, any
restraint of which would be injurious to the public, which has an interest paramount, or even superior, to any private rights of the parties to the contract.
Partial restraints in such cases have long been held invalid, but heretofore
the doctrine has not been applied to water. The instant case, therefore, involves no new or controverted principle, but is merely an extension of an old
rule, applying it to water.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO TRY CoNVICT DURING IMPRISONMENT FOR
ANOTHER CmE.-The relator was convicted of 'embezzlement and sent to the
penitentiary. He appealed, and during the pendency of the appeal he remained in prison. In the meanwhile, the same curt which sentenced him
took steps to place him on trial for another crime. He sought a writ of
prohibition. Held: Writ discharged. State ex rel. Meininger z. Breuer, 264
S. W. I (Mo. 1924).
Under the great weight of authority, a court having jurisdiction over
the person of a prisoner by virtue of his presence within the jurisdiction has
the right to place him on trial, during his imbrisonment, for another crime
which he had previously committed. Rigor v. State, ioi Md. 465, 61 At. 631
(19o5) ; Commonwealth v. RamUnno, 219 Pa. 204, 68 At. 184 (1907); Ponzi
v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254 (1921). Contra: Ex parte Meyers, 44 Mo. 279
(x869); State v. Buck, 12o Mo. 479, 25 S. NV. 573 (1893). The reasoning of
the latter cases is that a prisoner undergoing sentence is in the custody of
the law, different from that of a criminal court, and hence the latter court
cannot acquire jurisdiction until the discharge of the prisoner. This minority
rule would seem to be unsound, since it may be carried to the absurdity that
one having committed a crime and being still under suspicion, may commit
and be convicted of a lessor offense and thereby hinder all attempts to place
him on trial for the graver one, until after the expiration of his sentence,
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when an acquittal might be more easily obtained. Then, too, the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution guaranteeing a speedy trial,
might then be successfully pleaded. But even those courts which follow
such a rule make an exception where the prisoner has committed a crime
while undergoing sentence in prison, in which case the prisoner may be
immediately tried for the offense. Kennedy v. Houvrd, 74 Ind. 87 (1881);
Ex parte Allen, i96 Mo. 226, 95 S. V. 415 (19o6) (by virtue of statute).
The same reasoning applies to cumulative sentences as to the right to try
a prisoner during his confinement. The great weight of authority is that
such cumulative sentences may be imposed, and when imposed, the second
sentence usually becomes effective upon the termination of the first. Rex v.
Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (Eng. 1770); Kite v. Commonwealth, ii Mete. 581
(Mass. 1846); Ponzi v. Fessenden, supra. Contra: Miller v. Allen, Ii Ind.
389 (1858) ; James v. Ward, 2 Metc. 271 (Ky. 1859).
The instant case, overthrowing the doctrine of Ex Porte Meyers, supra,
and State v. Buck, supra, places the courts of its jurisdiction in line with the
great weight of authority, and establishes a rule conducive to greater justice,*
and productive of a more salutary effect on the community.
FRAUD AND DEmIT-MEASURE OF DAMAG.-The plaintiff, in selling the defendant a pop-corn machine, fraudulently represented no other machine would
be sold in the defendant's town. The same day the plaintiff sold another
machine. The defendant, sued for the balance of the purchase money, filed
a cross-petition asking for damages. Held: The measure of damages is the
difference between the actual value of the machine in competition with another and its value if the plaintiff's representation were true. Holcomb &
Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 228 Pac. 968 (Okla. 1924).
The rule laid down in the principal case, that the measure of damages to
a purchaser for the fraud of his seller in inducing him to enter into a contract is the difference between the actual value of the property sold and
the value it would have had if the representations were true, is the weight of
authority in this country; Mueller v. Michels, 199 N. W. 380 (Wis. x24);
Sullivan v, Helbing, 226 Pac. 803 (Cal. z924); and the measure of recovery
is not affected by the question whether the purchaser paid more or less than
the actual value of the property he received. Murray v. Jennings, 42 Conn.
9 (1875). The theory upon which this doctrine is based is that a purchaser
who acts honestly on his own part is entitled to the full fruit of his bargain
and cannot, without his consent, be deprived thereof by the fraud of the
seller. Cases upholding the doctrine that the measure of damages is the
difference between the value of the property received and the price paid are
fewer in number, but constitute a vigorous minority. Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n. v. Pierce, 254 S. V. iO9 (Tex. 1923); Hooning v. Henry, io6
Ore. 605, 213 Pac. 139 (1923). This rule is well settled in England, Simons
V. Patchett, 7 El. & BI. 569 (Eng. 1857); Tztvcrosi v. Grant, 36 Law Times
I. 812 (Eng. 1877), and in the Federal Courts of this country. Smith v.
.Bolles, 132 U. S. 125 (1889); Rockefeller v. Merritt, 76 Fed. 909 (C. C. A.
1896). The principle upon which these cases proceed is that to consider as
an element of recovery the value the property would have had if the repre-
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sentations had been true would enable the plaintiff to recover anticipated
profits and not merely the actual loss, which is the true measure of damages in a tort action. In Bokoshe Smokeless Coal Co. z. Bray, 55 Okla. 446,
i55 Pac. 226 (1916), decided in a jurisdiction where damages are assessed
under the majority rule, the court held that "anticipated profits of a commercial or other like business are too remote, speculative and dependent upon
unceriainties to warrant a judgment for their loss." However, if the form
of action is ex contractu, the majority rule can hardly be questioned, since
in such action the plaintiff is entitled to receive compensation for the loss of
his bargain. Page v. Johnston, 203 Mass. 274, 91 N. E. 214 (19xo).
In Pennsylvania, compensation for the actual loss sustained by reason
of the deceit is the measure of the plaintiff's damages. Weaver v. Cone, 12
Pa. Super. 143 (igoo). This would seem to bring the state within the minority view assessing damages as the difference between the value and the
price paid for the property, and some cases so hold. High v. Berret, 148 Pa.
26!, 2.3 AtL oo4 (1892). But there are other cases in which the courts lay
down the majority rule that the measure of damages is the difference between the actual and represented values. Stetson v. Croskey, 52 Pa. 230
(1866); Lukens v. Aiken, i7"4 Pa. 152, 34 Ati.'575 (x892). However, in these
latter cases, the represented value of the goods was also the price paid, so
that the same decisions would have been reached under both rules.
It is submitted that the instant case was correctly decided, since the
fraudulent representation was a part of the contract itself and in a suit on
the contract, the plaintiff's damage is the loss of the benefit of his contract
I.%jUNcrioxS-REs'itAiNT OF NUISAxCE-BALANCE OF IxjuRY.--The plain-

tiff maintained a nursery in the vicinity of the defendant's light and power
plant, and had done so for more than twenty years prior to the defendant's
establishment. In the production of power and light, upon which the city of
Pittsburgh and its environs were. dependent, the defendant's plant discharged
large quantities of soot and sulphur dioxide, which materially destroyed the
plaintiff's nurseries. The plaintiff sought an injunction. Held: Injunction
denied. Elliott Nursery Co. v. Du Quesne Light Co., 29x Pa. ix(4 z26 AtL.
345 (1924).

It has been said that in the matter of nuisances a chancellor dispenses
injunctions as a matter of grace and not of right, and that in determining
whether he shall grant an injunction, he is to discern whether or not he will
cause greater hardship by issuing or by denying it. and in so doing,
he is to balance the respective injuries. Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 150 (1868) ;
Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. io2 (1871); Bliss v. Anaconda Copper 3fining
Co., 167 Fed. 342, 365 (19o9). This view, originating in a time when kings
bestowed their royal favors through their chancellors, is still to be found in
the modem decisions. Daniels v. Keokuk Water Works, 6z Ia. 549, 16 N. V.
7o5 (1883). The weight of authority today, however, would seem to be
contra, and where a complainant can show the existence of a valuable right,
which has been substantially and materially interfered with by an artificial
nuisance, and the injury is a continuing one, requiring a multiplicity of suits,
an injunction will issue as a matter of right, and relief is not dependent upon
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any balance of injuries. Attorney Gcneral v. Council of Birminghan, 4 Kay
& J. 528 (Eng. i858); Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540,
-- Ati. io65 (i904): Judson v. Los Angeles Sub. Gas Co., 157 Cal. z68, io6
Pac. 581I (i9o). The fact that the defendant is a public or quasi-public
service corporation will not be grounds for withholding relief, even though
such defendant serves thousands of people. Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co.,
7 De Gex, M. & G. 436 (Eng. 1857); Village of Dwight v. Hayes, iso Ill.
273, 37 N. E. 218 (1894); Stock v. Township of Jefferson, 114 Mich. 357,
In Attorney General v. Gaslight and Coke Co., L. P
72 N. W. 132 (x897).
7 Ch. Div. 217 (Eng. 1876) a gashouse was restrained even though-it was operating by municipal permission, where its operation had been adjudged a
nuisance.
The instant case is interesting in that it would seem to mark a reversion
to the "matter of grace" doctrine laid down in Richard's Appeal, supra,
which was followed until practically overruled by Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., supra, and although the court in the instant case seeks to distinguish the latter case, yet it substantially ignores the doctrine promulgated
therein. Of the two views, it is submitted that the one announced in Sullivan
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., supra, which is also the weight of authority,
is the better. Where a valuable right is materially interfered with, for which
there is no adequate remedy at law, it should be protected regardless
whether the interest against which protection is sought is great or small. If
such interest greatly affects the public, then proceedings in the nature of
public condemnation should be instituted. Otherwise, to refuse relief would
be practically to take property without due process of law.
.

INsuAxcE-Vtm-FAmmE To TAKE AcTIoN Ar-mit NoTic' OF Paoms?

op PRnmium CHnE-The insured sent his check to the insurance company
at the time when his premium was due and received an unconditional receipt.
When the check was presented to his bank it was protested and returned tot
the company, which held the check for nine days, until it received word of
the death of the insured. The insured had acted in good faith and did not
know of the protest. The company refused to pay the full value of the
policy and the beneficiary sued. Held: She could recover. Since the retention of the protested check gave the company a right of action which it had
not formerly had, these facts were sufficient to justify the finding of the
trial court that there had been a waiver of the forfeiture in fact. although not
in law. State Life Insurance Co. v. Little, 264 S.W. 319 (Texas 1924).
The usual life insurance policy contains a clause providing for forfeiture of the policy upon failure to pay any premium at the time specified.
The courts, however, do not favor forfeitures. Slight acts will be construed
as a waiver on the part of the insurer where the condition in the policy is in
favor of the company. Hartford Life Insurance Company v. Unsell, z44
U. S.439 (i82-) ; Federal Life Insurance Company v. Sayre, 142 N. E. 223
(Ind. 1924). When some good ground in the conduct of the insurer, on
which the insured may base his default, cannot be shown, the forfeiture will
be enforced. Thompson v. The Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 252 (1881); Philadelphia Life Insurance Co. v. Hayworth, z96 Fed. 339 (Ig94). Waiver has
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been found where the policy contained a receipt for the first premium, although in fact notes had been given for part payment and one of them was
overdue and unpaid; McAllister v. New England Insurance Company, 1x
Mass. 558 (86g); and where the animal insured had died before the payment of a premium seven months overdue. Western Insurance Company v.
Scheidle, I8 Neb. 495, 25 N. W. 620 (1895). In two cases- the policy was
held to be in force until cancelled by some positive act on the part of the
insurer. Brady v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of America, 9 Misc. 6, 29 N. Y.
Supp. 44 (894); O'Brien v. Same, 12 Misc. 127, 33 N. Y. Supp. 67 (1895).
The holding of a check during correspondence with the insured was held to
be evidence that the policy had niot lapsed in a case similar to the instant one.
Veal v. Security Mutual Life Insurance Co., 6 Ga. App. 72, 65 S; E. 714
(gog).
It is submitted that the finding of the trial court in the principal
case is based on a logical extension of the law of the decided cases and
that the higher court was right in supporting it.
INTTSATE COmmEcE-TRAM PASSING BETwEEN Two POINTS IN A

an action under a state law, it became necessary to determine if a message from one town to another in the
same state, transmitted by way of another state, was intrastate commerce.
The usual way was to send the message more directly within the state. The
message was relayed outside the state to suit the convenience of the telegraph company. Held: This was intrastate commerce. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Wood, 264" S. W. xi8 (Tex. 1gz4).
The instant case holds that it was within the contemplation of the parties to use the usual line within the state, and that, therefore, as a matter of
contract the message was intrastate; that the telegraph company could not
evade a liability by using an interstate line. In a recent case which has
caused much discussion it was held that a message sent by the usual way
outside of the state, was a matter of intrastate commerce. Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Sharp, 121 Ark. 135, I8o S. W. 504 (1915). This decision would
appear to be authority for the principal case, but on reasoning the two are
opposed. It was based on three cases recently overruled and now may be
taken to have been repudiated in its own state. Shannon v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 152 Ark. 358, 238 S. W. 59 (x922). There is no doubt that it is
now the law that a telegram, sent by the only or usual way out of the state,
is in interstate commerce, even thqugh between two points in the same state.
STATE BY WAY OF ANOTHER SATE.-In

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boiling, 12o Va. 413, 91 S. E. 154 (1917) ; "West-

ern Union Tel. Co. v. Bushnell, 73 Ind. App. 5ix, 128 N. E. 49 (.92o). And it
has been held that where a telegram could have been sent with equal dispatch either entirely within the state or by way of another state the use of
the interstate line was interstate commerce. Taylor v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 199 Mo. App. 624, 204 S. W. 88 (1918).
The Amendment of June x8, 1910, 36 STAT. AT L 539, to the Commerce
Act of 1887 indicates that only messengers "wholly within one state" are
matters of .intrastate commerce. Before this -amendment the principal case
would have been followed in many jurisdictions which, like the principal
case, refused to follow Hanley v. Kansas, Etc., Ry. Co., 187 U. S. 617 (1903),
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at applicable to telegraph cases. For a development of telegraph law
from railroad cases see 4 VA. L. R V. 35 and L R. A. i9i8A (805). The
United States Supreme Court has clearly applied the latter case to telegraph cases. and has held that a message passing out of a state becomes interstate commerce as a matter of fact, irrespective of the motive of the
telegraph company. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight, 254 U. S. 17
This interpretation was refused in the instant case but has been
(92o).
generally accepted. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Beasy, 2o5 Ala. i£$, 87 So.
858 (92o); Son v'. Western Union Tel. Co., £I5 S. C. 520, xo6 S. E. 507
(i92z); Shannon v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra. It has been suggested that
the rule would not be applied where there was an attempt to avoid a state law;
Bateman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 'i4 N. C. 97, 93 S. E. 467 (1917); but
this is repudiated in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, supra. See alsd
Kirinyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 569 (i914).
It is submitted that the instant case draws distinctions from the Federal
authorities which are not well founded; and that it is clearly established by
Federal and state courts that interstate commerce is a matter of fact, and
that if a telegram is sent outside of 'a state, in transmitting it from one
town to another within the state, it is a matter of interstate commerce
whether so sent necessarily or not.
LABOR LAw-STRiKEs-DREss-MOPoLY.--The defendants called a
strike of the workers in the plaintiffs' employ, members of a union embracing ninety-five per cent. of the workers in the clothing trade in the city of
New York, and in order -o secure labor and avoid the very heavy loss of an
idle plant, the plaintiffs agreed to a contract with the union by which the
number of persons employed by the former, the amount and distribution of
work sent out to be done by submanufacturers, and the identity of those
submanufacturers was closely regulated. After working .under this agreement one season and having violated some of its clauses, the plaintiffs sought
to have it set aside. Held: The contract was not obtained by duress and
was valid. Maisel v. Sigman, 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 8o7 (z924).
The validity of this contract obviously depends upon whether or not
the means used to obtain it were lawful; Carew v. Rutherford, io6 Mass. x
(87o) ; a subject on which there is wide diversity of opinion. Kemp v.
Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. . 389 (1912). The right to strike is
now well recognized, but the majority of courts hold that it can be employed
only for certain purposes, as for better working conditions, shorter hours, or
increased wages; Kemp v. Division No. 241, supra; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207.
Pa. 79, 56 At. 327 (903) ; DeMinico v'. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N. E. 317
(igx) ; while others, as in the principal case, hold that it is an absolute
right and that if the means employed are not in themselves illegal the object sought cannot make them so. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council
and see able discussion in Allen v. Flood,
T54 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (i9og).
(1898) A. C. I (Eng.). It seems that this is the better view, so long as no
contract is violated and no statute or rule of public policy of general application is contravened. The old idea of the common law of what constitutes
a conspiracy or acts in restraint of trade has long since lost all reason for
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existence, and has been swept away completely in many jurisdictions. On
this basis the present case would be correct.
But it appears from the facts of this case that the defendant organizations amounted to a monopoly in this field. A monopoly is forbidden both
by Federal law, 26 STAT AT L. 2o9, ch. 647, sec. I, which was before the
Clayton Act amendment, 38 STAT. AT L. 731, ch. 323, sec. 6.held applicable
to such cases as the present; United States v. Elliott, 64 Fed. 27 (C. C. 1894),
United States z. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C. C. 1894) ; and New York statute,
PFNAL LAW, sees. 580-582. amended LAws OF 1918, c. 491, which does not
specifically exempt such cases as the present from its operation, though interpreted to do so in the principal case. New York has recognized and forbidden an effective monopoly in this field when created by an association
of employers; Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 2 (1897) ; McCord
v. Thomnpson-Starrett Co., x29 App. Div. 13,

11.3 N. Y. Supp. 385 (i9o8);

as distinguished from an agreement by a single employer; Jacobs v. Gohen,
183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (igo5) ; but in the principal case the court refuses
to extend the rule logically to an association of employes equally powerful.
In other states, statutes such as those referred to above have been specifically held applicable to monopolies of labor, although Pennsylvania, by ACT
OF i89i, P. L. 300, sec. x. has removed all criminal liability as a conspiracy in
such cases. It is submitted that whenever a labor organization becomes; so
powerful as to enforce its demands by shutting off entirely the labor supply
of an industry, it should be regarded in the same light as; a monopoly in any
other field; Bishop v. American Preserver? Co., 157 Ill. 284, 310, 41 N. E.
765 (1895); Commonwealth v. Dyer, 243 Mass. 472, 486, 138 N. E. ,96, 303
(1923) ; and its contracts held, even at common law, invalid and voidable by
action of the other party.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIOS--ORDINANCES

PROHIBITING

DISTRIBUTION

OF

CiRCuLARS.-Defendants were arrested for distributing pamphlets criticising
the local municipal government and indicted under an ordinance prohibiting
"the distribution of circulars, pamphlets, etc., in the public streets." The
court held the ordinance unreasonable because it prohibited the distribution of
circulars of all kinds. It took judicial notice of the fact that the distribution
of advertising matter has a natural tendency to litter the streets, but refused to
exfend this principle to include such circulars as were in fact distributed.
Coughlin v. Sullivan, 126 Atl. 177 (N. J.Sup. Ct. i924).
Municipal ordinances prohibiting the distribution of advertising circulars on the streets have been uniformly held a reasonable exercise of the police
power, although the distribution alone made the offense complete. The opinions have been based upon one of two grounds. Some courts have recognized in whole or in part the doctrine laid down in the principal case that
the natural result of the distribution of advertising matter is the littering ot
the streets. Wc1ttengel v. Denver, 20 Colo. 552, 39 Pac. 343 (WW5); PhilaOthers have gone upon
delphia v. Brabend&r, 2o1 Pa. 574, 5i At. 374 (902).
the principle that such a prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power
t does not conflict with any fundamental right of citizenship and
so long as -.
that the right to advertise by this particular method is not such a right. In re
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Anderson, 69 Neb. 686, 96 N. V. i49 (1903) ; People v. Hor-wii, 27 N. Y.
Crim. Rep. 237, 140 N. Y. Supp. 437 (1912). Similarly it has been held that
such an ordinance does not interfere with interstate commerce. International Text Book Co. v. Auburn, 155 Fed. 986 (C. C. i9o7). Where the ordinance itself limited its application to advertising matter, a New York court
refused to extend the term "advertising" to include a circular against the
Ku Klux Klan, and further held that such an interpretation would make the
statute unconstitutional as an unreasonable regulation in conflict with the right
of free speech. People v. Johnson, 117 Misc. 133, 191 N. Y. Supp. 750 (i92i).
In an early and oft-quoted case on this subject in Michigan an ordinance
similar to that in the principal case was held unreasonable as applied to the
distribution of circulars advertising a Y. M. C. A. gathering. The court in
this case seemed to base its decision partly on each of the two general theories
already discussed. People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N. W. 275 (1889).
As a practical matter the results under these varying doctrines have been
uniform. Where the distribution was in fact of a commercial nature the
offender has been held, whereas in all other cases the distributors have been
released. It is difficult to understand upon what ground the courts can hold
that it is common knowledge that a large portion of all advertising distributed on the streets is thrown away, whereas a similar situation is not presumed as to the unregulated distributions of the so-called reformers. It is
submitted that the sounder doctrine is that which holds such ordinances reasonable until they conflict with some fundamental right of citizenship.
Puaic UTmIrY-UNICWiAL GOLF COURSE-POWER OF CITY TO PURCHASE.
-The City of Portland purchased land for a municipal golf links- and financed
the transaction by issuing "public service certificates" which the city had
charter power to issue to acquire facilities for doing "municipal work," or to
purchase "any part of any public utility." A taxpayer questioned the validity
of the issue. Held: The issue is valid. Copen v. City of Porland,228 Pac.
io5 (Oregon, 1924)..
If this decision means merely that purchasing land for a public golf
course is "municipal work," it is in accord with the general rule. By the
weight of authority, it is legitimate municipal endeavor for a city to supply
its citizens with libraries, museums and places for public recreation. Colnmonwealth v. Harrigan,84 Mass. 159 (i86i) ; Laird v. Pittsburgh, 205 Pa. z,
54 Atl. 324 (19o3) ; Lambert v. Owunesboro Public Library, i5i Ky. .725, 152
S. W. 802 (1913). The cases recognize that some sort of a "public use" or
"public interest" is necessary in order to bring the endeavor within their
scope, but usually consider that any project merely convenient to the public
or "in some manner concerning public welfare" is within this rule. Feldman
& Co. V. City Council of Charleston, 23 S. C. 57 (885).
It seems reasonable to include a municipal golf course in such a category.
However, if the principal case means to decide that a public golf course
is a "public utility" within the meaning of that phrase when used in connection with eminent domain, the case is not so well supported by authority.
In this connection the term is generally limited to include only such projects
as are termed "public necessities" or "public needs." Memphis Freight Co. v.
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City of Memphis, 44 Tenn. 419 (1867); Edgewood Railroad Companys Appeal, 79 Pa. 269 (1875); Appeal of Rees, 8 Sad. 582, 12 Atl. 427 (Pa. i888).
True, there are authorities for the proposition that even in this connection, a
"public use" or "public utility" includes anything of "convenience" to the
public. Overnian Silver Min. Co. v. Corcoran, is Nev. 147 (i&o) ; .Coo,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed., 1903), 532. However, these authorities cite railways and turnpikes as examples of public "conveniences." It is
at least doubtful, then, that even these authorities would include a public golf
course as a public "convenience."
It seems, therefore, that the court in the principal case, in using the
phrase "public utility" meant to use it in its broad sense, as including anything benefiting the public by furnishing means for public pleasure, education or recreation; and not in the narrower sense, as including only those
things in which the public has such a vital interest as; to justify the taking of
private property. It is submitted that the decision is sound. and that the
only possibly objectionable feature in the case is the court's unqualified classification of a public golf course as a public utility, without explanation of the
scope in which this flexible term was intended to be used.
ToRTs-INJuRY TO TREsPAss~m-LTATLITY or LA-mowNER.--Several small
boys came upon the defendant's land without permission. They were playing there when the defendant appeared with a stick in his hand. The defendant "chased" the boys from the lumber pile. One of the boys in his attempt to escape ran into the street and was killed by a trolley car. Held:
There was no liability in absence of proof that the defendant's conduct was
wilful or malicious. Miller v. Oscar Schmidt, Inc., 126 At. 309 (N. J. L.
1924). (The facts of the case are very unsatisfactorily reported. It is impossible to tell from the report how close the defendant was to the deceased
or how great was the probability under the surrounding circumstances that
injury would result from the defendant's act. Knowledge on these two points
is really necessary for a proper understanding of the case.)
It is well settled that an owner of property may eject a trespasser, using
whatever force is reasonably necessary. Lewis v. Arnold, 4 Car. & P. 854
(i83o) ; Comm. v. Clark, 2 Met. 23 (Mass. i84o) ; Liclhtenwallner v. Lauterbach, io5 Pa. 366 ('884). The privilege to use force, however slight, does
not exist in the first instance, but only after the trespasser has been notified to
depart and refuses to do so. Cox v. Cooke, i Marsh., J. J., 36o (Ky. 1829) ;
Emnsons v. McQuade, 176 Mo. 22, 7"5S. W. io3 (i9o3). When the privilege
to use force exists but the force used is excessive it is uniformly held that
the privilege has been exceeded and that the owner has committed an assault. Tallmadge v. Smith, iot Mich. 370, 59 N. W. 370 (1894); Deragon v.
Sero, 137 Wis. 276, IX8 N. W. 839 (1o98); Newcome v. Russell, 133 Ky.
Whether a person may threaten to use force
29, 117 S. W. 305 (9o9).
which he would not be privileged to use is a question not settled by authority. If the threat is made with a deadly weapon and the owner would not
have been justified in using it he is held to be guilty of an assault. James v.
Hayes, 63 Kan. 133, 65 Pac. 24; (19o); Lewis V. Fleer, 30 Pa. Sup. 237
'(i9o6), semble; Stoic v. Paxon, 6 Boyce 249, 99 Atl. 46 (Del. 1916) ; but cf.
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Slate v. Yancey, 74 N. C. 244 (1876). In the instant case it is clear that a
grown man would not have been privileged to use a stick to drive away the deceased. However, the facts do not reveal that the defendant was close
enough to the deceased to warrant the finding of a technical assault. If such
were the case the test of liability would be different; Kline v. Kline, I58 Ind.
6o2, 64 N. E. 9 (io2) ; Lonergan v. Small, 81 Kan. 48, 1o Pac. 28 (i9o9);
and a recovery might well have been permitted.
When the injury results to the trespasser not directly from the defendant's act but as the proximate result of that act the courts seem to 1050
sight of the fact that the defendant is still exercising a privilege. Many
courts treat the situation from the standpoint that the plaintiff was a wrongdoer. Therefore under the "Massachusetts view," under which the principal
case is decided, the defendant is liable only for wilful and wanton acts resulting in injury to the plaintiff. Bjornquist v. Boston & Albany R. R., i8S
Mass. 13o. 7o N. E. 53 (i9o4); Hoberg v. Collins, So N. J. L 425, 78 AtL
166 (ixgo). The "Michigan view" requires that after the trespasser's presence is known the owner is bound to ekercise ordinary care with regard to
him. Herrick v. IVixom, 121 Mich. 384, So N. W. 117 (1899); Brennan v.
Merchant & Co., 2o Pa. 258, s4 AtI. 891 (i9o3); Bucci v. Waterman, 25
P. I. 125, 54 AtI. io59 (I9o3). It is submitted that the latter is better in
that it recognizes that the defendant is exercising a privilege and that he
should act in such a way as not to exceed his privilege. Robert J. Peaslee,
Duty to Seen Trespassers, 27 H.Av. L REV. 403.
ToRTs--LiAirriY FOR DEATHn BY NEGIAGENT AcT-PANAA

CoD.--Plain-

tiff brought a civil action to recover damges for the death of his wife who
was killed in Panama through the alleged negligence of the defendant railway company. Section 2341 of the Civil Code of Panama, adopted in i86o,
was as follows: "He who shall have been guilty of an offense or fault, which
has caused another damage, is obliged to repair it, without prejudice to the
principal penalty which the law imposes for the fault or offense committed."
This law is still in force. The defendant contended that Section 2341 of the
Code was too general to be construed as a "death act" statute. Held (Taft,
C. J., Holmes, ., McKenna, J.., Brandeis, J., dissenting): For the defendant
Panama Railroad Company v. James Rock, United States Supreme Court, No.
4, 'October Term, ig24, decided November 17, I924.
Despite the maxim "There is no wrong without a remedy," the principle
became firmly entrenched at common law that the death of a human
being by a negligent or wrongful act could not form the basis of a civil
action for damages. 72U. OF PA. L. REv. 333. For reasons for this aiomalous rule see note in 41 L.R. A. 8o7. What the rule of the civil law was on
this subject does not seem to be altogether clear. T.FFANY, DEATH By VRosc.
FUL ACT (2d ed.), 2. The law of Panama being based upon the law of Spain,
which, in turn, has its source in the civil law, the question of whether the
civil law permitted an action for death by wrongful act became very pertinent in the instant case. In the works of Grotius there are statements indicating that the civil law did permit such an action. Book 2, c. 17, sec. i&
Rutherford in his INSTITUTES OF NATL'JRAL LAW, Book i, c. i7, see. 9, reaches
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a similar conclusion. In a case in the federal courts it was said that under
these circumstances the civil law permitted a recovery, but unfortunately nQ
authority was cited for the assertion. Holnes v. 0. & C. Railroad Company,
5 Fed. 75 (D. C. MQ8o). In this connection it is significant that such a right
of action has always been recognized in Scotland, where, it would appear,
the civil law is followed. 'ecins v. Mathieson, 4 Macqueen H. L. C. 215
(86) ; Clark v. Carbine Coal Company, (189I) A. C. 412. In the French regions of Lower Canada the same situation obtained. Ravary v. Grand Trunk
Railway Co., 6 Lower Can. Jur. 49 (i86o); Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v.
Robinson, 14 Can. S. C. zo5 (1887). This; question, however, was squarely present in two Louisiana cases, where it was decided that the civil law, like the
common law, denied such a right of action.. The statements in Grotius' writings, supra, were explained on the ground that he was not treating of jurisprudence but of the moral obligation to make indemnity. Hubgh v. New
Orleans & CarrolltonRailway Co., 6 La. Ann. 495 (i85i); Virghtie v. New
Orleans & Carrollton Railway Co., xi La. Ann. 5 (1856). HuGHEs ov ADMIRALTY, at page 196, is inclined to agree with the Louisiana court in the matter. The majority of the court in the instant case adopted the Louisiana interoretation.
It is significant that a provision identical to Section 2341 of the Civil
Code of Panama had for some time been a part of the law of France.
ConE NAPOLEO, x382 L. C. 2294. This provision had repeatedly been construed as authorizing a civil action for the wrongful or negligent taking of
life. Rolland v. Gosse, i9 Sirey (Cour de Cassation) -69; see cases in 3
FLZIER-HERMAN ANNOT. ED. CODE NAPOLEON 766; see also La Bourgogne,
2o U. S. 95 (i9o8). The law of Spain also contained this provision, and it
had been similarly interpreted. See Borrero v. Compania Anonyra de la Luz
Electrica de Pon.ce, i Porto Rico Fed. 114 (i9o3); 22 HARv. L REv. 409. In
the instant case. the court having determined that the civil law did not permit the action, refused to follow the interpretation of the French and Spanish
courts as to the scope of Section 234t, but decided to apply common law
principles to the determination of this section. Sutsman Co. v'. Vallace, r42
U. S.293 (1892). It, therefore, held the language of the section in question
too general to change the common law.
The dissenting opinion was written by Holmes, .1., who decried the tenacity with which courts adhere to rules of the common law which are "no
longer true sentimentally, and which are economically false." His position
was that the policy of this country, as evidenced by the present law in nearly
all the states, was antagonistic to the common law holding, and that the
United States in adopting this section of the Panama Code as the law of Panama had effectuated that policy. Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30 (C.
C. A. i9oS). It is submitted that the court in the instant case should have
permitted the plaintiff to recover, by giving to the words of the Panama Code
their natural effect, without reference to the unfortunate state of the common law on the subject.

